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INDIAN OCEAN POLITICS: AN ASIAN-AFRICAN 
PERSPECTIVE 
K. P. MISRA* 
The Indian Ocean area, comprising the world's third largest 
body of water and its littoral and hinterland, is vast and is of 
crucial significance when we consider the water space it covers, 
the countries and populations which it includes, the varied 
potential resources which it is either already known to possess or 
likely to have, the important transit routes of trade and commerce 
which it offers, and the political and military strategy which it 
calls for. All these factors have, during the last ten years or so, 
aroused unprecedented interest among scholars and men of public 
affairs, who are exploring and researching the various facets of 
the area. This trend is likely to continue in the coming years. The 
fact that developments in the area have engaged some of the most 
important organs of the United Nations since 1971 is a further 
indication of its significance. 
An outstanding feature of the situation in the Indian Ocean 
area is that none of the littoral countries has a sizable naval force. 
This is true of the present as well as of the past. Australia and 
India have no doubt large navies, but compared with the navies of 
the major powers outside the area, they are capable of performing 
only minor roles. The Indonesian Navy, is not only small, but is in 
poor condition at present. Some of the West Asian countries, 
notably Iran and South Africa, may develop navies of some 
consequence, but at present they are insignificant insofar as their 
relative strength is concerned. Thus, apart from Australia, India, 
and Indonesia, none of the littoral countries is a maritime power 
even of a minor kind if the global naval balance is kept in view. 
Thus, the littoral countries are not in a position, either singly 
or collectively, to influence the course of events in the area 
decisively insofar as their naval power is concerned. In respect of 
other varieties of power also, their position is far from strong. All 
in all, the Indian Ocean area is weak and undefended if one or 
more major outside powers decides to interfere militarily in the 
~ffairs of the area. 
The temptation among the major outside powers to influence 
the course of events in the area in a manner that would 
strengthen their own roles in world politics is thus strong. These 
* Professor of International Relations, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New 
Delhi. This paper is part of a book-length study, being published separately. 
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powers are well aware of the instances in history where powerful 
countries have taken advantage, often undue, of the weakness 
prevailing in other areas. 
Sea power and power on land are inextricably interwoven in 
practically all situations, and the Indian Ocean Area is by no . 
means an exception to the general rule. This is confirmed by the 
sequence of events since ancient times. For instance, activities in 
the Indian Ocean were dramatically increased and continued for 
many centuries after the consolidation of the empire of the 
Mauryas in India, leading to substantial political, cultural and 
commercial contacts between the Mauryas and many parts of 
Asia and Europe. 
A study of the history of sea power in the Indian Ocean 1 
would show that, because of the enormous size of the Ocean, it 
was not possible for any power until a couple of centuries ago to 
establish a decisive overall influence. Different countries have no 
doubt dominated its different sectors or parts, particularly in the 
ancient period. The modern history of the Ocean begins with the 
coming of Vasco Da Gama in 1494, at a time when neither any· 
littoral nor outside power was of any consequence in the Ocean. 
The Portuguese possessed a shrewd sense of politics and strategy 
and therefore, gave attention to both major sectors, east and west, 
of this vast expanse of water. But in spite of this they could not 
hold on for more than about a century. The Dutch entered the 
scene in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The 
French and the British initiated their efforts and competition in 
the following decades. 
Without going into the power struggle in detail in the Indian 
Ocean between these European powers in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century, we may note here that, under the peace 
arrangements made in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna, Britab1's 
sway over the Indian Ocean became more or less complete, a 
situation which continued for a century and a half. This is not to 
say that under Pax Britannica things always went smoothly. 
With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, a project accomp-
lished by the French without British participation, the element of 
competition and rivalry increased, and British dominance was 
impaired. 
Notwithstanding some strains, the British power in the 
Indian Ocean continued until the end of the Second World War. 
The latter half of the 1940s witnessed a turning point in the 
1. For an excellent treatment of the subject, see Auguste Toussaint, History of 
the Indian Ocean (Chicago, 1969). 
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history of international relations in general and of this area in 
particular. A variety of factors combined to herald an era of 
decolonization. The period witnessed the termination of British 
power in many areas. Its central piece, the subcontinent of India, 
came into its independence in 1947. This was followed by the 
emergence of a number of sovereign states around the Indian 
Ocean. 
The Indian Ocean obviously could not escape the effect of 
these fundamental political changes which were taking place in 
its coastal areas. These changes also profoundly affected the 
British position as a power in the international relations of the 
post-war period, not only in political terms but in economic and 
other related fields as well. The British land and air forces had to 
be either completely withdrawn from most of these coastal areas 
of the Ocean or substantially reduced. There was some diminution 
in the naval strength also. But in spite of these developments, the 
British naval power was a decisive military factor, particularly in 
Southeast Asia, in the balance of power in the Indian Ocean. The 
British persisted in maintaining this posture ostensibly on the 
ground that it would protect their vital economic interests in the 
area. 
In the new power landscape on the international level, there 
was clear disharmony between British power and the desperate 
attempt by Britain to maintain defence forces at the level at which 
they had been maintained during the days of the empire. Among 
other things, this caused grievous domestic economic problems at 
home. The Labour Party had a sharper and more objective 
perception of the situation. Thus, when Harold Wilson came to 
power in the middle of the 1960s, he seriously attempted to come to 
terms with the new realities of the situation. His Government, 
soon after assuming office, criticized its predecessor, saying that it 
had made "no real attempt to match political commitments to 
military resources, still less to relate the resources made available 
for the economic circumstances of the nation." In its judgment the 
defence forces it had inherited were "seriously overstretched and 
in some respects dangerously underequipped." Referring to its 
commitments outside Europe, the new Government unambigu-
ously proclaimed that "it is neither wise nor economical to use 
military force to seek to protect national economic interests."2 
2. For details, see Cmd Paper No. 2592, presented to Parliament in February 
1965. 
In a way this statement by the new Government was a culmination of the 
development of enlightened public opinion. An example of the growing public 
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The Labour Government undertook an extensive review of the· 
country's defence capabilities and obligations especially in the 
light of domestic economic resources and potentialities. Subse-
quently an announcement was made that British overseas forces 
east of Suez would be reduced by a third in the next four years. At 
the same time it was also stated that Britain would continue to 
play a military role in this area notwithstanding this decision. 
This announcement was further reinforced by certain decisions 
taken a couple of years later. In January 1968, the extent of 
Britain's interests in the world outside were spelled out. It was 
now clearly laid down that British military forces would withdraw 
east of Suez by the end of 1971. The cumulative effect of all this 
was that Britain had decided practically to retire from several 
areas, including the area east of Suez, by 1971. As The Economist 
pointed out, this amounted to "much more than a geographical 
shift in Britain's foreign policy. It was an abrupt narrowing of the 
area of Britain's concern in the world."3 
What were the implications of the British withdrawal? It was 
stated that since the British had virtually controlled the Indian 
Ocean in the preceding one-and-a-half centuries, their withdrawal 
wotJld amount to the creation of a power vacuum in the area. This 
approach was responsible for a conceptual framework which 
provided foundational material for the policy structures of certain 
outside powers. Hence it merits closer examination. 
To start with, it may be argued that the theory of a power 
vacuum was based on an assessment of dubious validity as 
regards the importance of Britain to an area which had been 
politically transformed in a fundamental manner. Instead of 
being made up of pockets and parcels of territory belonging to 
imperial powers, the area now had multiple polities which were 
sovereign, self-respecting members of the community of nations 
and which brooked no interference by outside powers. In the 
transformed situation the British role was inconsequential. Even 
if Britain had not wanted to withdraw, it would not have been 
possible for it to play any major role. An army of 70,000 men, 
supported by small air and naval power, could not play any 
significant role in an area as huge as the Indian Ocean. A few 
opinion in favor of withdrawal from the regions east of Suez is the following 
· editorial comment in The Observer (London) of 22 November i974, whiCli said: 
"Defence Planning has continually proved to be out of touch with political realities 
.... "Also, "How much of these vast sums of money is wasted on trying to keep UI:? 
a figure in the world which is no longer compatible with our resources or needs!" 
3. The Economist (London), 20 January 1968, p. 17. 
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instances are sufficient to substantiate this point. More than once 
the British troops suppressed violence in Mauritius which was by 
no means a major military operation, but when it came to bigger 
situations, Britain was more or less helpless. It was effectively 
powerless when violent eruptions occurred in Aden, or when 
conflicts between India and Pakistan broke out. Thus it must be 
clearly understood that the real power of Britain was in its 
territorial possessions, and once these achieved their political 
freedom, such military strength as it continued to retain in some 
parts of the coastal areas of the Ocean, indeed in the Ocean as a 
whole, became a matter of marginal significance from the political 
and strategic standpoint. Any talk, therefore, about the emergence 
of a power vacuum in this area as a consequence of the total 
withdrawal of British power is out of tune with the realities of the 
situation. 
Rooted in the traditional theory of power and balance of 
power, the power vacuum concept suggests that the new nations 
of Asia and Africa on the Indian Ocean are economically so poor 
and politically so vulnerable as to be unable to defend themselves 
from within as well as from without. A typical Western view 
representing the above position is to be found in an editorial of the 
New York Times which said: 
The harsh reality is that a complete British withdrawal. . 
would leave a dangerous power vacuum over a vast and 
volatile area which the United States' and Britain's other 
allies would find it extremely difficult to fill - a vacuum that 
would serve neither Britain's long run interests nor its stakes 
in world peace and stability.4 
In the context of the rivalry between the superpowers, this 
line of thinking has certain implications. 
First, if, taking advantage of the weak and inadequately 
defended area, one of the two superpowers were not to act, it 
would lag behind the other. Besides, forbearance would entail a 
number of disadvantages, for the other power would then take 
4. New York Times, 12 January 1968. It was an interesting coincidence of 
international politics that while the West was worrying about the power vacuum in 
the Indian Ocean area and the Soviet Union was accusing it of attempting to move 
into the area, the People's Republic of China, along with the West, was charging 
the Soviet Union with trying to fill the vacuum by stepping up its naval activity in 
the Indian Ocean. The New York Times, 19 and 20 May 1969, carried reports about 
these charges, and said that these charges had been repeated in several Chinese 
papers like Jen·min.Jih-pao and Hung chi. 
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advantage of the situation and initiate the necessary moves to 
promote its interests in the area and so create an unfavorable 
balance of power situation in this part of the world. This belief 
arises out of the general power politics attitude and is, therefore, 
applicable to similar situations in other parts of the world. 
Second, related to the first implication, though somewhat 
different from it, is the implication that the littoral countries need 
some sort of a guardian or caretaker in the area to protect them 
from possible mischief from the influence-seeking outside powers. 
This is supposed to be in the interest of the countries in the region 
because, if left unprotected, they would succumb to the pressures 
of outside powers equipped with far superior economic and 
military might. 
Third, the potential for conflict in certain parts of the littoral 
provides a tempting pasture for the outside powers, particularly 
for those powers which feel that their interests and obligations 
extend into this area. This is so because the littoral is particularly 
conflict prone: in the southern part of Africa, for instance, there 
have been clashes between the white minority who hold crucial 
positions and members of the overwhelming black majority; in 
West Asia there has been a continual armed confrontation 
between Israel and the Arabs, and a situation of "no war, no 
peace" still persists; in South Asia there have been conflicts 
between India and Pakistan, which, though local, were among the 
most serious of their kind; in Southeast Asia, apart from Vietnam, 
several conflicts have occurred and more may recur in the future. 
In all these conflicts the superpowers have been present by proxy. 
Their resources, economic and military, have played a role in 
sharpening conflicts. According to the power vacuum theory, if 
one superpower is attempting to influence the course of events in a 
conflict, the other superpower should also enter the race by aiding 
and supporting the rival party in the conflict, so that a 
disadvantageous balance of power situation may not be created 
for itself. Thus the theory assesses conflicts in terms of their 
implications for the real or imaginary interests of outside powers. 
Finally, in international relations it is well known how the 
superpowers have at suitable times endeavoured either to support 
regimes which, whether or not representative or legitimate, are, 
according to their calculations, convenient to them, or to subvert 
regimes which are inconvenient to them. A very interesting 
feature of this subterranean activity is that these powers have 
always disclaimed it. Hence, though it is not clearly and openly 
articulated, implicit in the power vacuum concept is the desire of 
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the outside powers to influence the domestic situation in littoral 
countries if that situation turns out to be unfavorable to them and 
if, in their judgment, the cost of influencing does not outweigh the 
benefits. 
Thus, the power vacuum theory, generating an artificially 
created atmosphere of competition and contention in the area, has 
domestic, regional and international ramifications. Of course, if 
one goes by the experience of the recent past, one finds that the 
activities of the superpowers cannot neatly be put into any one of 
these categories. Often the area is presented with a combination. 
In the context of the power vacuum theory, it is instructive to 
note how the Western press, especially the American press, as well 
as the scholarly studies on the subject, have openly talked about 
the so-called vacuum and stressed the need to take effective steps 
to fill it or, at any rate, to counterbalance the alleged Soviet naval 
build-up. For instance, the New York Times editorially stated soon 
after the British announcement in January 1968: 
The harsh reality is that a complete British withdrawal 
within three years would lead to a dangerous power vacuum 
over a vast and volatile area which the U.S. and Britain's 
other allies would fmd it extremely difficult to fill, a vacuum 
that would serve neither Britain's long term interests nor its 
stake in world peace and stability.5 
Some military strategists have greatly exaggerated the 
significance of Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean, and 
have said that the Soviets might soon "own" the Indian Ocean6 
and that there is a "Red star rising over the Indian Ocean."7 
Writing in Atlas, Guido Geroso emphasized that "the shadow of 
hammer and sickle today extends over the entire Indian Ocean. 
The Russian bear has replaced the British lion: a Tsar's dream 
has, by an historical paradox, been realized by the humdrum 
bureaucrat Brezhnev."B 
5. New York Times, 12 January 1968. 
6. Anthony Harrigan, "Soviets may 'own' Indian Ocean if US Does not Make 
Countermove," Navy: The Magazine of Sea Power (Washington, D.C.), Dec. 1969, 
p.-15. 
7. Anthony Harrigan, "Red Star over the Indian Ocean," National Review 
(New York), 20 April 1971, p. 421. 
8. Atlas (New York), November 1970, p. 21. Also see a letter to the editor by 
Philip K. Crowe, former American Ambassador to Sri Lanka, in the New York 
Times, 26 May 1968, Sec. IV, p. 19. 
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The Soviets have, at least in theory, denounced the concept of 
a power vacuum without reservation and have characterized it as 
a "notorious thesis." A Soviet commentator wrote in Izvestia in 
1971 that "a vacuum is an airless void, a term quite inappropriate 
when speaking of our planet today. Hardly any political 'blank 
spots,' by which I mean places without independent states are 
left."9 Thus the Soviet Union appears to be in sympathy with 
littoral sentiment that the idea of a power vacuum smacks of 
imperialist thinking. 
It would, however, be relevant to examine whether there is 
harmony between Soviet theory and practice with respect to the 
situation in the Indian Ocean area. While it is true that the Soviet 
Union has denounced military or naval bases and does not 
attempt to have any, in the sense in which the Americans are 
trying to have them, it would be wrong to conclude that it is a 
silent spectator to the developments in the area. In order to protect 
its vital economic and political interests and to maintain a type of 
balance of power situation which would not be disadvantageous to 
it as a global power, it is bound to act. In fact it has acted, 
although the pattern of its activity and initiative has been 
different from that of the United States. The manifold increase in 
its activity in the Indian Ocean, beginning with 1968, and its 
initiatives in the littoral states are evidence of its active interest in 
the area. 
In a nutshell it may be said that in practice the responses of 
the outside powers, particularly the superpowers, to the emerging 
situation in the Indian Ocean area are basically similar. The 
Soviet rejection of the theory of a power vacuum is more an 
exercise in semantics than a reliable guide to its actions. In 
essential respects the policy objectives of the two superpowers 
seem to be similar although the pattern and timing of initiatives 
and the concrete instruments used to achieve objectives have, no 
doubt, been different. Because of this broad similarity in their 
approaches, they have, in the Indian Ocean as well as in the 
littoral countries, escalated tensions through their various acts of 
omission and commission. Fortunately for the area, the tensions 
have remained at a relatively low level so far. How they are going 
to be in the years to come is hard to tell. Present trends do not 
encourage us to be sanguine. 
The whole concept of a power vacuum and its implications are 
repugnant to the vast number of Asian-African countries. It is the 
9. V. Matveyer, "Stuffed 'Vacuum'," Izvestia (Moscow), 28 May 1971. 
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considered view of these countries that the concept is contrary to 
the philosophy of nonalignment; that it is a negation of their 
national hopes and aspirations; that it may undermine their 
independence; and that, finally, it would retard their socioeco-
nomic development.10 
The unfolding of the disagreeable developments caused 
concern among those countries which were directly affected by 
them. They were well aware of the "handsome" contribution that 
the contention and competition between the superpowers had 
made in different parts of Africa and Asia to the generation of 
tensions and conflicts, including about a dozen major armed 
conflicts in West Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia during the 
last two decades or so. Hence they could not remain silent and 
helpless spectators to the developing situation. 
In order to raise their voice against the escalating possibility 
of tension, the littoral countries did not have to try to search or 
discover a common approach and/or ideology. Most of them had 
been broadly wedded to the theory and practice of nonalignment, 
which consisted, inter alia, in keeping the power politics of outside 
powers out of their affairs lest it do multiple damage to their 
development. This umbrella came handy to them in their effort to 
deal with the outside instigation of tensions. 
It is interesting that the beginning of the efforts and 
initiatives by outside powers in the Indian Ocean area were 
coincidental with the discussions between the littoral state at 
different levels and forums. However, this is not to say that the 
former was not the cause of the latter. 
Perhaps the first indication of the general approach of the 
countries in the area to the problem was articulated in the second 
nonaligned conference held in Cairo in 1964. The Conference 
welcomed the proposal to denuclearize Africa and Latin America 
and recommended "the establishment of denuclearized zones 
covering these and other areas and oceans of the world, 
particularly those which have been hitherto free from nuclear 
weapons." 11 There could be two possible explanations for 
suggesting that the Indian Ocean area should be made a 
denuclearized zone and not a peace zone. First, the horrible 
implications of the various types of nuclear weapons had become 
quite evident in the early 1960s. Hence there was an effort to save 
10. For a widely shared view of the nonaligned countries, see the speech of the 
Prime Minister of India in The Times of India (New Delhi), 29 April 1973. 
11. Conference of Heads of States and Government of Non-aligned Countries 
(Cairo, Ministry of National Guidance Publication, 1964), p. 350. 
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as much part of the globe as possible from the evil effects of 
nuclear weapons. Second, at the time of the Cairo Conference the 
nature and extent of the activities of outside powers in the Indian 
Ocean area had not yet given cause to the littoral and immediate 
hinterland states to suspect that peace was going to be in danger. 
The idea of making this area a peace zone had not thus become an 
attractive proposition at that stage. 
The closing years of the 1960s, however, witnessed qualitative 
change in many respects in the area. The change resulted from 
three factors: (1) efforts to establish some sort of a base in Diego 
Garcia in the middle of the Indian Ocean especially by the 
Americans; (2) movement of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean; 
and (3) supply of arms by the British to the South African 
Government under the Simonstown Agreement.12 The first two 
factors had wider and deeper significance than the third. 
The implications of the change were recognized by the 
countries of the Indian Ocean area. By the time the third 
nonaligned conference met in Lusaka in 1970, the former "British 
Lake" had already become a victim to the strategy and tactics of 
outside powers. Consequently, in Lusaka the subject came up for 
reflection and decision more specifically and in relative detail. 
Many heads of state and government expressed themselves on the 
subject in their formal speeches, although, of course, some were 
more interested in the subject than others. For instance, 
expanding upon the implications of t_he third factor mentioned 
above, Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi observed: 
We have been deeply disturbed by the reported intention of 
the United Kingdom and other Governments to supply arms 
to the Government of South Africa. This dangerous and 
retrograde step will threaten the neighbors of South Africa 
and also the Indian Ocean Area. . . . We would like the 
Indian Ocean to be an area of peace and cooperation. 
Military bases, of outside powers, will create tension and 
great power rivalry.1a 
The Prime Minister of Ceylon also drew the attenti~n of the 
delegates to the emerging problem. She reminded the Conference 
12. This development ceased to be of importance subsequently because, in 
June 1975, the two countries formally cancelled the agreement. There are, however, 
press reports that South Africa may enter into some sort of an arrangement with 
the USA. 
13. Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), no. 491, 21 September 1970. 
Paragraph 18 of the text of her speech is reproduced on pp. 21-23. 
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of her earlier statements in Cairo and elsewhere, and pleaded that 
"the Indian Ocean area be declared a nuclear free zone. We urge 
that all countries bordering the Indian Ocean should join us not 
only in giving effect to this proposal but also in keeping the 
Indian Ocean as an area of peace."14 
She therefore proposed a comprehensive plan for a peace zone, 
which included the concept of a nuclear-free zone among many 
other points. 
As an organized body of nonaligned countries, this Confer-
ence for the first time passed a formal resolution on the subject. It 
pledged to work for the adoption of a declaration by the United 
Nations on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. It urged that "a 
declaration should be adopted calling upon all states to consider 
and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which Great 
Power rivalries and competition, either Army, Navy, or Air Force 
bases, are excluded. The area should be free also of nuclear 
weapons."15 
This resolution marked indeed a very significant step in the 
efforts of the nonaligned group, which consisted substantially of 
the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean. The 
significance lay not so much in its being the first resolution of its 
kind as in the basic thesis which it attempted to propound. In 
effect, the resolution had three strands. The first was addressed 
implicitly to the United States and its Western allies and made it 
clear to them that their military bases - present as well as 
prospective - were unwelcome. The second in effect communi-
cated to the Soviet Union that its naval activity, especially that of 
the preceding couple of years, was not to the liking of the area. 
Finally and positively, all nuclear powers were asked to keep this 
zone free from such weapons. 
It seems that after Lusaka, informal exchanges of views 
continued on the subject among the countries of the area. In the 
months following the Conference, it was realized that a concerted 
effort on their part was called for and that, the most appropriate 
forum for such an effort would be the United Nations. Conse-
quently, a few months later, in September 1971, when the Foreign 
Ministers of fifty-four nonaligned countries gathered for the UN 
General Assembly Session, they held a meeting to discuss this 
subject. They reaffirmed the Lusaka declaration at this meeting, 
14. For the text of her speech, see Ceylon Today (Colombo), September-October 
1970, pp. 5-6. 
15. Paragraph 8(6) of Resolution 12 of the Lusaka Declaration. Ibid., p. 33. 
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and declared that "the participants in the Consultative Meeting 
recognized that, in keeping with the Lusaka declaration, the 
creation of zones of peace would contribute to international peace 
and security, and the stability of all states and peoples."16 They 
also agreed that concrete steps should be taken at the 26th Session 
of the General Assembly to implement the decision relating to the 
declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, contained in 
paragraph 8(6) of Resolution 12 of the Lusaka Declaration. 
It may be recalled that the developments which were taking 
place in the southernmost tip of the African continent had created 
a sense of special urgency among the countries of the Indian 
Ocean area. Indeed, most of them had already in various regional 
and global forums expressed their opposition to the resumption of 
the supply of arms by Britain to South Africa under the 
Simonstown Agreement of 1955. As was indicated earlier, because 
of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, the Suez Canal had been closed, 
adding considerably to the importance of the Cape route, which, 
according to the British, needed protection against the threat of 
growing Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean. The concern of the 
littoral and other nonaligned countries was genuine, and they 
raised it in numerous international forums: the United Nations, 
the Lusaka Conference, and, later, the Singapore Conference of 
the Commonwealth Heads of State held in January 1971. 
At the Singapore Conference, the issue assumed the propor-
tions of a crisis, and to some observers it appeared as if the very 
survival of the Commonwealth as an international institution was 
at stake. The situation was saved by the appointment of an eight-
nation committee to study the question and report back to it. This 
Committee had scarcely begun its work when the British 
announced their decision to sell "wasp" helicopters to South 
Africa, a decision which virtually wrecked its work. As a reaction 
to this decision most of the members of the Committee decided to 
quit, which resulted in the disintegration of the Committee. 
Because nearly half the countries of the Commonwealth were 
either littoral or immediate hinterland states of the Indian Ocean, 
the work of making the Indian Ocean a peace zone begun in 
Lusaka was resumed at the Singapore Conference. Ceylon had 
done its homework rather seriously, and its Prime Minister 
circulated a paper on the subject, the opening paragraph of which 
highlighted the emerging landscape in the area. It stated: 
16. Quoted in UN Doc. A/C. 1/PV. 1836, 25 November 1971. 
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Recent reports point to an increasing naval presence of the 
Soviet Union and naval fleets in the Indian Ocean. It would 
also appear that these fleets carrying nuclear capability, are 
becoming part of the strategic defence system of the world 
powers. Another disturbing development is the militarization 
of the Indian Ocean. The same reports indicate that various 
islands and landbased facilities are being utilized to facilitate 
the operation of these fleets. . . .11 
The paper also contained some elements of the idea of a peace 
zone. When Ceylon put this proposal before the Conference, the 
substance of it found general acceptance. In the final commu-
nique, it was declared that the Conference "agreed on the 
desirability of ensuring that it [the Indian Ocean] remains an area 
of peace and stability."1B 
Thus by the beginning of the 1970s, informal discussions and 
some formal references had brought matters to a point where 
better and more organized efforts were called for. It was now 
considered opportune to make a move in the United Nations. 
Among the countries of the Indian Ocean area most actively 
interested in the idea of a peace zone, it was given to Ceylon (now 
Sri Lanka) not only to take formal initiatives, but also to foster 
the idea. It made its first formal initiative when its Permanent 
Representative, Shirley Amerasinghe, addressed a letter on 1 
October 1971 to the Secretary General of the United Nations, 
under Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, 
requesting that the "Declaration of Indian Ocean a Zone of 
Peace," be placed on the Agenda of the 26th Session.19 A week 
later, on 8 October, on the recommendation of the General 
Committee, the General Assembly decided to include this item in 
its agenda and instructed its First Committee to consider the 
matter and report back to it. 
Since the inscription of this item on the agenda of the UN 
General Assembly in the first week of October 1971, the subject 
has been deliberated in all successive sessions. The subject has 
also been touched upon in many other bodies of the Organization, 
but the main debate and discussion, including the expression of 
views by the littoral countries, has been in the First or Political 
Committee. In the General Assembly, during plenary meetings 
and during voting on the peace zone resolutions, the views 
17. For the full text,' see National Herald (Lucknow), 23 January 1971, p. 5. 
18. For details, see The Times (London), 23 January 1974, p. 4. 
19. UN Doc. A/8492 and Add. 1. On 6 October 1971, the United Republic of 
Tanzania became a co-sponsor of the letter. 
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expressed in the First Committee were more or less repeated. It is 
a very interesting and instructive exercise to study (a) how 
opinions were expressed in the first round and (b) how they 
underwent transformation, in some cases substantially and in 
some others peripherally. It is also noteworthy that the views of 
some countries have been remarkably consistent throughout. 
Notwithstanding the efforts of the Indian Ocean countries, 
the two superpowers and other major maritime users of the Indian 
Ocean have declined the invitation to attend the proposed 
Conference on the Indian Ocean. In such a situation, it would be 
worthwhile for the Indian Ocean countries to consider whether a 
conference without these powers would serve any real purpose. 
Looking at the developments of the previous years - passing 
of the resolution about a peace zone in 1971, establishment of the 
Ad Hoc Committee in 1972, preparation of the factual statement of 
the military presence of the Great Powers in 1973, the decision 
to convene an international conference in 1974, 1975 and 1976 
further requesting the littoral and hinterland states to intensify 
their efforts with a view to giving shape to the various aspects of 
the Conference on the Indian Ocean - one must draw cautious 
conclusions. In terms of substance the progress made cannot by 
any standards be called significant. The main reason is the "total 
indifference" of the superpowers, which continue to augment their 
military strength in the Indian Ocean and its littoral. Differences 
among the littoral and hinterland countries, largely for this 
reason, are also a factor of considerable importance in the way of 
achieving more than what has actually been accomplished. But a 
sense of realism should inform us that establishment of a peace 
zone in the Indian Ocean cannot be isolated from the other 
currents of the contemporary international order. Hence, such 
modest results as have been achieved, through a slow and halting 
process, need not make one utterly pessimistic, although what 
happens ultimately depends upon the unity and harmony between 
the countries of the area and the attitude of outside powers. 
The littoral response is enshrined in the concept of the zone of 
peace, which has been a subject of numerous bilateral and 
multilateral declarations, particularly since 1971. However, 
surprisingly little attention has been paid thus far to the problem 
of analyzing the fundamentals of the concept and the problem of 
considering it as a systematic and coherent body of thought. Some 
people, especially in the West, have criticized it on various 
grounds. An instance in point is an observation made in a recent 
study which characterizes the UN treatment of this problem as 
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marked by "oversimplification, misrepresentation, euphemism, 
and cant."W 
A perusal of the relevant UN documents, as also of some other 
declarations made by leaders of the nonaligned world, would 
reveal that the peace zone concept has been evolving in response 
to the unfolding political and strategic scenario in the Indian 
Ocean during the last decade or so, and particularly during the 
1970s. Deeply rooted in the basic tenets of nonalignment, the 
concept has been enriched by the contribution of several leaders of 
Asian and African states whose interests are inextricably linked 
with developments in the area. 
The country that took the initiative and did most to formulate 
the peace zone concept was Sri Lanka. Under the leadership of 
Prime Minister Sirimao Bandaranaike, the representatives of Sri 
Lanka have, in the United Nations and elsewhere, left no stone 
unturned to make this idea a living reality. As mentioned 
previously, the concept was first initiated in the United Nations 
by Sri Lanka's Permanent Representative, Shirley Amerasinghe, 
who suggested that the "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a 
Zone of Peace" be included in the agenda of the Twenty-sixth 
Session.21 
After several rounds of discussions that took place at various 
levels among leaders of the littoral and hinterland states and after 
the exchange of ideas in the General Assembly's First Committee 
in October-November 1971, certain fundamentals were agreed 
upon among the promoters of the concept. These were set forth in 
a resolution passed by the Assembly during its Twenty-sixth 
Session.22 The resolution is of the utmost significance because, of 
the six resolutions passed so far, this is the only one to deal with 
the substantive aspects of the subject. The other five resolutions 
are essentially procedural in nature. Hence this resolution, along 
with the explanations and clarifications given by its promoters 
when the subject was under consideration, constitutes the basic 
source material on the subject. 
As usual, the 1971 resolution in effect had two parts, 
preambular and operative. The preamble deals with the rationale 
and circumstances which prompted the move. Though not as 
important as the su.bsequent part, it provides the philosophical 
20. See W.A.C. Adie, Oil, Politics and Sea Power: Indian Ocean Vortex (New 
York, 1975), p. 1. 
21. See, supra note 19. 
22. See UN Doc. A/Res./2832, passed by the 2022nd plenary meeting held on 
16 December 1971. 
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background and the theoretical justification for the resolution's 
operative clauses. History is full of instances where introductory 
paragraphs have been referred to in interpreting the meaning of 
resolutions. 
A study of the six paragraphs in the preamble substantiates 
the claim made by Mrs. Bandaranaike that the "concept of peace 
zone is inherent in the concept of nonalignment .... "23 Indeed 
these paragraphs restate the basic factors which have promoted 
nonalignment. The resolution opens with subjects of prime 
importance to the countries of the area, namely, the "determina-
tion of the peoples of the littoral and hinterland states of the 
Indian Ocean to preserve their independence, sovereignty, and 
territorial integrity, and to resolve their political, economic and 
social problems under conditions of peace and tranquility." It then 
refers to the Lusaka declaration, particularly to the section 
emphasizing that superpower rivalries and military bases were 
bound to hinder socioeconomic reconstruction. Then there is a 
statement that military alliances entail diversion of scarce 
resources from urgently needed development, which, in tum, 
increases tensions in different societies. Finally, the preamble 
expresses the concern of the littoral and hinterland countries at 
the signs of an increasing arms race in the area, and asserts that 
the establishment in the Indian Ocean "could have a beneficial 
influence on the establishment of permanent universal peace 
based on equal rights and justice for all, in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." 
1 The substantive part of the resolution consists of three main 
categories and is of greater significance. It has aroused the 
opposition of the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as 
that of some of their friends and allies. It begins with a statement 
of the basic position. Innocent in nature, this declares that for all 
time to come the Indian Ocean, along with the air space over it 
and the ocean floor under it, is a zone of peace. The extent of the 
Ocean is not defined, but this problem was subsequently 
considered by the Ad Hoc Committee, which, in its first report, 
said that "the question of definitions was emphasized early in the 
23. Mrs. Bandaranaike provided the foundation of the whole concept of the 
peace zone in her speech before the General Assembly on 12 October 1971. "The 
main thrust of Mrs. Bandaranaike's nonalignment policy," rightly observes a 
perceptive Sri Lanka scholar, "was directed to obtaining acceptance in the comity 
of nations of her own pet proposal to ensure that the Indian Ocean was made a 
peace zone." "U.S. Policy after 1956", Asian Survey (Berkeley, Calif.), December 
1973, p. 1135. Also see UN Doc. A/PV. 1962, October 1971, pp. 1Q-13. 
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debate and involved such aspects as the limits or boundaries of 
the zone of peace." While stressing the need for "accurate 
definitions," the report indicated that an exercise of this nature 
was not necessary "at the initial stages."24 
How the extent of the Indian Ocean should be fixed, is not a 
simple problem. If and when an attempt is made, some ticklish 
problems are likely to be encountered. For instance, what would be 
the relationship between the peace zone and areas of national 
jurisdiction? Also, what criteria does one use in determining the 
outer limits of the Indian Ocean, a vast and ambiguous area 
extending from Asia and Africa to Oceania? Keeping these 
various aspects of the subject in mind, the sponsors of the 
resolution thought that it would be sensible simply to state a 
principle. Once this was agreed upon, discussions could be held 
with a view to formulating an "accurate definition." 
A report submitted by a committee of experts to the UN 
Secretary-General in May 1974 seems to have made a constructive 
contribution towards resolving the problem.25 In the General 
Assembly debate, delegates of some countries asked who would 
determine the limits of the peace zone and through what 
instrumentality that decision would be made. The proponent of 
the peace zone resolution, Amerasinghe, responded: "Clearly 
through the process of international negotiations and consulta-
tion, and final agreement through an instrument in the form of an 
international treaty."26 It would have been unrealistic to have 
attempted to solve all problems during the initial stages. 
Subsequently, the matter remained under consideration of the Ad 
Hoc Committee, and its second report27 said that it considered it 
desirable to have definitions laid down of certain important terms. 
One of these terms is: "limits of the Indian Ocean, in the context 
of the declaration of the Indian Ocean, as a zone of peace." The 
Committee decided in 1976 to undertake to define all the basic 
concepts and terms. 
The second paragraph of the operative part ofthe resolution is 
addressed to the superpowers and is indeed the heart of the 
concept. It urges those powers - none of which borders on the 
Indian Ocean - to consult the littoral countries with a view to 
24. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Indian Ocean, Official Records of 
the General Assembly (GAOR), 28th Sess., Supp. No. 29(A/9029), p. 2. 
25. For the text, see UN Doc. AI AC.159/1, 3 May 1974, Annex IV, p. 1. This 
report was subsequently replaced. 
26. See his statement in UN Doc. AIC. 1/PV. 1842, 1 December 1971, p. 55. 
27. GAOR, Session 29, Supplement No. 29(A/9629), para. 34. 
18 CONTEMPORY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
reducing or scaling down their competition and contention, 
military or otherwise, in the area. It calls for a halt to the 
"escalation and expansion of their military presence" and 
categorically demands that the superpowers should withdraw 
from all of their military bases and installations, remove all 
nuclear weapons and terminate all manifestations of superpower 
rivalry in the area. 
The supporters of the peace zone idea have pointed out on 
numerous occasions that the level of superpower rivalry has been 
gradually increasing though it is not yet very high. If, however, 
superpower rivalry is not controlled, it is likely to assume 
dangerous proportions. The representative of Sri Lanka stressed 
this point: 
If there are regions of the world where the arms race has not 
yet assumed menacing proportions and where there is still 
even a remote possibility of preventing its intrusion, the 
countries in that region could best serve the cause of peace 
and their own interests by making a concerted effort to arrest 
and reverse such developments or forestall them in their 
region. There is one area of the world that is both historically 
conditioned to adopt such a policy and where actual 
circumstances are peculiarly favorable for the adoption of 
the policy that is the Indian Ocean area. 28 
The third part of the resolution's substantive section is 
addressed to three sets of countries and takes care of the 
important dimensions of the concept of the zone of peace. The 
countries are: 
(a) the littoral and hinterland states, 
(b) the permanent members of the UN Security Council, and 
(c) other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean. 
Of course, the above countries constitute all those who have 
anything to do with the Indian Ocean, both as to territory and as 
to national interests. They are urged to enter into consultations so 
as to ensure the following situation. 
The three dimensions highlighted in this part of the resolution 
are of vital significance. The first two relate to the use of the 
Indian Ocean. They declare that warships and military aircraft 
should not be allowed to use the Ocean "for any threat or use of 
28. UN Doc. A/C. 1/PV. 1834, 23 November 1971, p. 77. 
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force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or independ-
ence [of the countries of the area] in contravention of the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." This is 
clearly prohibitory in nature. The third says that "the right to free 
and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations is 
unaffected." This freedom is not absolute; it is circumscribed by 
the earlier provisions of the resolutions on the one hand and the 
norms and principles of international law on the other. In the 
course of the discussions in the First Committee, some countries, 
especially the United States, the Soviet Union and France, raised 
the matter of the relationship between the rules of the new 
regional order proposed under the peace zone plan and the 
universally accepted principles of the international law of the sea. 
They sought to make the point that the peace zone must not affect 
the freedom of the seas. They said it in 1971 and have repeated it 
since on numerous occasions. We may briefly analyze the views of 
the two superpowers. 
The views of the U.S. delegate, though briefly stated in two 
interrelated points, were lucid. He thought that the resolution 
might adversely affect the security interests of his country and its 
friends and allies in the Indian Ocean area: "This [resolution] 
may affect the fundamental security interests not only of states 
compelled to maintain significant military preparedness . . . but 
also of states that rely on the stability created by a political and 
military balance .... " He also argued that the resolution was 
likely to preempt efforts to create a new regime of the law of the 
sea inasmuch as it proposed a special set of rules for a particular 
area, thus setting a "dangerous precedent." "We reject the view," 
he declared, "that a group of states in a certain region can 
establish a legal regime for the high seas in that region."29 
The response of the Soviet Union was not dissimilar; its 
representative stated: 
The declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace must 
not lead to undermining or weakening existing generally 
recognized principles of international law; this measure must 
be carried out in full conformity with generally recognized 
principles of international law on the freedom of the high 
seas, enshrined in the Geneva Convention of 1958 on the 
high seas.ao 
29. UN Doc. AI C. l!PV. 1849, 10 December 1971, p. 17. For the full text of the 
speech, see pp. 16-17. 
30. UN Doc. AI C. V /PV. 1841, 1 December 1971, p. 47. 
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The sponsors of the peace zone idea, clear in their minds 
about their objectives, gave assurance that it was not their 
intention to circumscribe the existing law of the sea in its 
essential respects. Besides, in view of the apprehensions expressed 
at the very initial stages, they immediately incorporated a clause 
(already quoted above) categorically upholding the principle of the 
freedom of the high seas. It is important to remember that the 
peace zone idea does not prohibit the presence or passage of 
warships as such over the Indian Ocean. The objection arises only 
when this activity poses a threat to the sovereignty and integrity 
of its littoral. 
Since this is the main point which is being raised against the 
zone of peace proposal, a brief comment on the present state of the 
law of the sea is in order here. Since many facets of the 
international law of the sea are open to differing interpretations, 
it would lead to a better understanding for this discussion if the 
existing body of law were divided into two parts, one dealing with 
the peaceful use of the sea and the other relating to the use of the 
sea for war purposes, although in many situations it is well 
nigh impossible to distinguish between the two. There should be 
no doubt in anyone's mind that the peace zone concept does not, 
in any way, affect the peaceful uses of the sea, such as fishing or 
laying of submarine cables and pipelines or overflights. But when 
it comes to using the Indian Ocean for war purposes, the situation 
is different. For instance, according to the present law of the sea 
as adumbrated by the Geneva Convention of 1958, military uses of 
the sea are more or less freely permissible. Hence the stipulation 
in the peace zone resolution prohibiting warships and military 
aircraft, not always but under certain circumstances, from using 
the Indian Ocean is sure to have implications for the existing 
body of the law of the sea. Implementation of the resolution would 
modify the law of the sea in certain·respects. 
This stipulation was placed in the resolution because of the 
continued warlike and interventionist activities of certain outside 
powers. The proponents of the peace zone idea became increas-
ingly resentful of and concerned about the emerging superpower 
rivalry and the quickening of the pace of events, beginning in 
1968. "Must the wishes of a large group of small nations," asked 
Amerasinghe while moving the resolution in the First Committee, 
"in this instance the littoral states of the Indian Ocean and the 
hinterland states of that Ocean, be subordinated to the interests of 
the great powers that wish to be free to send their vessels for any 
purpose whatsoever into the Indian Ocean, vessels not of peace 
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but their vessels of war?" On behalf of the countries concerned, he 
declared: "We cannot possibly in this stage and time subordinate 
the peaceful interests of these small states to the will, to the 
prejudices and to the predilection of the Great Powers. And it is 
that understanding that we want from them."31 Keeping all these 
points in view, a pertinent question was asked: What is the need 
for the naval presence of outside powers to ensure freedom of 
navigation once the concept of the peace zone has been imple-
mented? 
During discussions within the United Nations, the advocates 
of the peace zone idea have repeatedly attempted to distinguish 
between two types of measures, one dealing with disarmament 
and the other with international security. They argue that theirs 
is an international security approach. In the context of the 
General Assembly resolution32 passed at the Twenty-fifth 
Session, particularly paragraph 20, they highlight the appeal 
made to all states to make urgent and united efforts for the end 
and reversal of the arms race, both nuclear and conventional. 
Amerasinghe put it well when he said that by doing so "for the 
first time the General Assembly conceived the idea that athletes 
run backward."33 
. These efforts were to be made within the framework of the 
Disarmament Decade as well as through other means and it was 
under the latter means that the peace zone idea was being 
promoted. 
Through these means, peace, as opposed to disarmament, was 
emphasized, although whether peace should come first or 
disarmament was like the chicken and the egg controversy. The 
delegate of Sri Lanka stated: 
The disarmament approach to peace and security, we 
consider totally inadequate and some of the measures 
undertaken under that approach we consider to be blissfully 
irrelevant: blissfully because they create a false sense of 
security and lull the world into complacency: irrelevant for 
the reason that they call for the renunciation of what has 
already become obsolete or unnecessary, or impose limita-
tion, or reduction that in no way reduce the arms race.34 
31. UN Doc. A/C. 1/PV. 1842, 1 December 1971, p. 57. 
32. UN Doc. A/Res./2734(XXV}, 16 December 1970. 
33. UN Doc. A/C. 1/PV. 1904, 29 November 1972, p. 3. Emphasis added. 
34. UN Doc. A/C. 1/PV. 1904, 29 November 1972, pp. 4-5. 
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The peace zone approach considered this way of doing things to 
be inadequate. Consistent with the basic philosophy of nonalign-
ment, it emphasized the need to create an atmosphere or climate 
of peace that would render all manner of armament unnecessary 
and futile. On this view the peace zone idea was one that was 
meant to contribute to international security.35 
An important implication of the implementation of the peace 
zone proposal for the littoral and hinterland countries was 
highlighted during discussions. This was with reference to nuclear 
weapons. The countries in the Indian Ocean area, in order to 
effectuate the peace zone idea, will have to commit themselves to a 
policy (a) of denuclearization or renunciation of the nuclear 
weapon option and (b) of refusing the use of their territories to the 
nuclear weapons of other states. 
There is some confusion and difference of opinion about the 
relationship of these two points. It may be pointed out that the 
two ideas are not really mutually dependent. Denuclearization is 
part of the wider question of nuclear disarmament at a global 
level, whereas the peace zone idea is related to the issue of 
preventing superpower competition from intensifying in the Third 
World areas following a detente in the industrialized parts of the 
world. 
It was fe1t that if these two commitments were not undertaken 
by the countries in the area, they would have no justification 
whatsoever in calling upon the outside powers not to deploy these 
nuclear weapons in the area. Thus, conceptually, the peace zone 
idea was wider in content and unambiguously included the 
element of the nuclear-free zone.3s 
Yet another commitment was a logical outcome of the 
implementation of the peace zone idea. This was about the use of 
force. It would have to be agreed that, except in self-defence, force 
would not be used against another country in the area.37 The 
35. It may be interesting to note that the littoral states never liked this subject 
to be considered under disarmament items in the United Nations. See UN Doc. 
A/PV. 2111, 15 December 1972, p. 41. 
36. Sri Lanka said that "the countries of the region, both littoral and 
hinterland states, as well as the countries outside the region, but militarily active 
in the region, would have to assume certain commitments if any stable agreement 
is to be reached. As far as the countries in the region are concerned, they will have 
to commit themselves to a policy of denuclearization which would entail 
permanent renunciation by them of a nuclear weapon option and the assumption 
of an obligation to deny the use of their territories and their territorial waters and 
their air space to nuclear weapons belonging to other states." See GAOR, 28th 
Sess. Supp. No. 29 (A/9029), p. 10. 
37. Ibid. 
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acceptance of this principle posed no problem. However, when it 
came to implementing it in a concrete situation, the difficulties 
that arose appeared more or less insurmountable. 
What is important about these points is that, while evolving a 
framework for the peace zone concept, the concept's advocates 
were not oblivious to their own obligations and difficulties in 
discharging them. 
These are the various dimensions and elements of the zone of 
peace concept. Though these have taken shape in the background 
of the historical and current experience of the countries in the 
Indian Ocean area, they are not, and perhaps could not be, very 
clear-cut and precise. If and when the idea materializes, it will 
have to be tested on the touchstone of reality. The mood and the 
sense of realism of the Indian Ocean countries do not indicate that 
they regard these elements as sacred. The implication of this is 
that the littoral countries would be willing to discuss these 
elements with outside powers and modify their stand to the extent 
they deem reasonable and consistent with their basic objective. 
In spite of the ever-growing support for, indeed near 
unanimity in favor of, the peace zone idea among the countries of 
the littoral of the Indian Ocean and also of others in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America, all permanent members of the Security 
Council except China and all outside maritime users of the Indian 
Ocean except Japan have refused to cooperate with the countries 
of the area. Thus, for example, the USA, the UK, France, the 
Soviet Union and other maritime powers (except Japan) all 
refused to attend the conference provided for in the 1974 General 
Assembly resolution. In February 1976 the United States and 
Britain entered into a new agreement about the expansion of 
naval facilities on Diego Garcia. These are the most telling 
examples of their attitude towards the peace zone plan. Right from 
the start of the discussions in the United Nations in 1971, they 
have taken a negative attitude. We have also shown how 
untenable their view is. Their attitude on the whole has hardened, 
although there are minor variations in their stand. 
The entire movement to have a zone of peace in the Indian 
Ocean arose on account of the activities of outside powers, 
particularly the superpowers. Now if their noncooperation is 
uncompromising, what is the result of individual pronouncements, 
bilateral declarations, recommendatory UN resolutions, and even 
possible urgings of the conference on the subject? What means 
and methods are available to the advocates of the peace zone idea 
to persuade or compel outside powers to change their present 
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attitude? Theoretically perhaps one can think of levers. For 
instance, if all the Asian-African countries solidly join together 
and boycott outside powers in certain respects, it may create real 
difficulties for the latter. Or, more concretely, if the supply of some 
essential raw material as, e.g., oil, which is perhaps the most 
important of them, is stopped, outside powers are sure to face 
problems not easily surmountable. 
It is said that a step easier and more effective than all this is a 
threat by the Indian Ocean countries to withdraw from the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPI') which the superpowers consider very 
important. It is argued that most of the littoral countries in any 
case do not have nuclear capability and that their withdrawal 
from the NPT would not create any suspicion regarding their 
intentions. Their continued adherence to the NPT should be made 
contingent on the superpowers agreeing to the peace zone idea. 
This course of action, others claim, is likely to provoke military 
response. 
Here two points need to be explored. First, if there is collective 
action by the countries of Asia and Africa, other powers are bound 
to retaliate. They have their own levers to use which are in some 
cases more powerful and likely to constitute a more severe blow to 
the interests of their opponents. A situation like this might well 
lead to a global economic upheaval and perhaps to armed conflict. 
It is not in the interest of anybody to risk such disastrous 
consequences. Second, a concerted effort on the part of the Asian 
and African countries presupposes a deep commitment to the 
peace zone idea and a firm determination to sink or swim 
together. Although there is broad support for the peace zone idea 
in the Asian-African world, it is doubtful if their commitment or 
determination is equally firm. Some countries are paying just lip-
service to the idea, and their commitment is essentially shallow. A 
variety of complex factors, domestic as well as external, is 
responsible for this situation. Hence to expect a really united 
action is to take an overly optimistic view of the situation and to 
minimize the differences of outlook obtaining among the countries 
of Asia and Africa. The oil embargo imposed by the Arab 
countries during and after the October 1973 conflict had its own 
destructiveness and is not a reliable guide to future actions. 
Also, in order to establish a peace zone regime, a series of 
multilateral agreements and treaties must be concluded on 
sensitive and controversial issues. Some of these issues involve 
clashes of interests. How to keep the area free of nuclear weapons, 
how to demarcate lines between national jurisdiction and the 
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peace zone, how to remove foreign bases, and how to insulate the 
socioeconomically weak and politically vulnerable area from 
superpower politics, etc., are some of the difficult problems that 
need to be resolved. The odds appear to be too formidable. 
In the present stalemate the countries in the Indian Ocean 
area appear to be in sort of a blind alley. Therefore, the crucial 
task of statesmen concerned is to devise alternatives for 
preventing the superpowers from using the Indian Ocean as yet 
another arena for their competition and conflict. In ideological 
and philosophical terms the alternative presented by the 1971 UN 
peace resolution and supported by more and more members of the 
United Nations in the years since then is the most acceptable one 
of the countries of the area. But the negative attitude of outside 
powers to the idea makes it almost impossible to implement. 
if the peace zone idea turns out to be unworkable, is there an 
alternative? The answer depends largely on whether the ruling 
and other elite groups in the Soviet Union and the Western world 
feel sufficiently concerned about escalating tension in the Indian 
Ocean. It is significant that at times strong concern has been 
expressed at the highest levels of the ruling hierarchies. Though 
progress has been almost negligible, some important initiatives 
have been taken by responsible leaders. A number of enlightened 
scholars have also come out with some proposals which amount to 
offering alternatives to the peace zone idea. 
Mention has already been made of a Soviet Government 
memorandum submitted to the United Nations in December 1964 
entitled "Measures for Further Easing of International Tension 
and Restructuring the Arms Race." This memorandum devoted a 
section to the question of establishing nuclear-free zones and 
proposed the Indian Ocean as one such zone. This proposal did 
not evoke any response from the other parties, and it seems that 
in the subsequent few years the Soviet efforts also became 
somewhat dormant. 
For a variety of reasons, the Soviet Union took two initiatives 
in the year 1971. According to a U.S. Government spokesman, in 
the spring of 1971 "mutual naval restraint" was informally 
SJiggested by the Soviets.38 In June of the same year, Moscow 
again proposed to Washington that the limitation of naval forces 
38. Proposed Expansion of US Military Facility in the Indian Ocean 
(Washington, D.C. 1974). See the testimony of J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr., Deputy 
Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, p. 4. The indication was 
made in March by the Soviet Ambassador in Washington. The June proposal was 
made by Brezhnev himself. 
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be discussed. Apart from this, however, no specifics and details 
were mentioned. American sources disclosed that when they asked 
Moscow for a clarification and elucidation of the idea, they drew a 
virtual blank.39 In spite of this, the American response was 
theoretically positive. It was clearly stated on behalf of the 
American Government that "we remain interested in any idea 
that might in the future develop along these [restraint] lines, 
perhaps, in the form of explicit understandings to avoid competi-
tion while safeguarding our respective interests in the Indian 
Ocean."40 
The Soviet initiatives and the American responses to them 
have not made any further headway. Perhaps the main reason for 
this is the lukewarm attitude of both sides. But in the background 
of this rather low-key activity, some thought seems to have been 
given to the nature of the arms control arrangement that might be 
possible in the Indian Ocean. At least the approach of Washing-
ton has been broadly identified. The main features of the 
approach41 are the following: 
1. There are two main interrelated problems: actual deploy-
ment and the facilities which enable deployment. 
2. From the American point of view, deployment is more 
important because the Soviets have an edge over them in this 
respect. 
3. An arms control agreement is possible when there is a 
"general balance of capabilities" between the two superpowers. A 
situation like this serves as an incentive for arms control efforts. 
4. By expanding facilities in Diego Garcia, the Americans 
are attempting to secure a "general balance of capabilities" and 
promote chances of arms control in the Indian Ocean. 
5. An arms control agreement between the two superpowers 
would not by itself eliminate their naval presence from the area 
altogether. 
This scenario of arms control arrangement between the two 
superpowers is of course, steeped in the traditional theory of 
balance of power, which is anathema to the nonaligned world. 
One must, however, deal with the world as it is. Hence, in spite of 
39. The American version may be quoted: "In spite of our inquiry in Moscow 
regarding the Indian Ocean question, we have received no further clarification of 
what the USSR may have had in mind nor any indication that they had an 
interest in P,Ursuing this subject further." Ibid. 
40. Ibid. Emphasis added. 
41. Many of these emerged in the discussion during Congressional hearings. 
Ibid., pp. 21-49. . 
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its obnoxiousness, the view cannot altogether be ignored while 
considering either the peace zone proposal or the alternatives to it. 
Although the U.S. Government's attitude is not very helpful 
from the standpoint of the Indian Ocean countries, several 
individual Americans, including members of Congress, academics 
and even public officials, have made suggestions which, in effect, 
constitute alternatives to the peace zone proposal. Elliot Richard-
son, when he was Under Secretary of State, urged that the USA 
should acknowledge and develop "spheres of restraint," particu-
larly in areas such as the Indian Ocean, where competition had 
not yet become acute.42 The importance of such statements lies in 
the fact that they facilitate the task of exploring solutions for the 
problem. Among academics, Howard Wriggins of the Southeast 
Asia Institute at Columbia University heads a section which feels 
concerned about the developing situation and wants to circums-
cribe the undesirable consequences of the present competitiveness 
in the area. He categorically states that the efforts by the USA to 
increase its naval force in the Indian Ocean are undesirable both 
for the USA and for the countries of the Indian Ocean area. The 
way out suggested by him in one of his writings is as follows: 
The best way to avoid a new arms race in the Indian Ocean 
would seem to be to negotiate a formal neutralization 
agreement among the US, the Soviet Union, Britain, France 
and the littoral states. (If possible, the People's Republic of 
China could also be included .... ) If a full neutralization of 
the Indian Ocean should prove unrealizable a less ambitious 
agreement might at least limit the numbers and types of 
naval vessels each Super Power could introduce there at any 
given time.43 
These two points are included in the five-point plan of action 
recommended by him to his Govemment.44 As is evident, he does 
not support the peace zone proposal, nor is he in favor of 
42. See speech by Elliot L. Richardson, reported in Department of State 
Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), 18 May 1970, pp. 628-31. 
43. See Howard Wriggins, "Heading Off a New Arms Race: Let's Try to 
Neutralize the Indian Ocean," War/ Peace Report (Washington, D.C.), September 
1971, pp. 7-11. He expressed similar views in some other writings also. 
44. They may be reproduced here: 
1. Retain its small Indian Ocean force at its present strength, but gradually 
replace its aging vessels with more modern ones; 
2. Press upon the Soviet Union and other naval powers, including the littoral 
states, the desirability of an agreement prohibiting entry into the Indian 
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unlimited naval competition between the two superpowers in the 
Indian Ocean. Instead, he offers some ideas which can serve as 
alternatives to the peace zone proposal in the event of its being 
found not realizable in the near future. Similarly, William Barnds 
of the Council of Foreign Relations correctly diagnoses the 
situation when he says that the kind of new balance or 
equilibrium which the two powers are seeking in the Indian Ocean 
is "costly and dangerous." He pleads for the establishment of a 
"low-level balance" through some sort of arms control between the 
USA and the Soviet Union.45 
The work of Congressional leaders is · perhaps the most 
significant in that they have greater influence with the Adminis-
tration and can help mold public opinion. Congressional 
opposition to the naval base in Diego Garcia has, undoubtedly 
during 1974-76, done most to keep tensions at a relatively low 
level. Many members of Congress have expressed themselves 
against turning the Indian Ocean into another arena of the cold 
war. By opposing the policies of the Nixon and Ford Administra-
tions towards upgrading Diego Garcia and by obstructing passage 
of budgetary proposals relating thereto, they have made a 
constructive contribution towards staving off a superpower 
confrontation. 
The Carter Administration's efforts to seek an understanding 
with the Soviet Union on arms limitation in or demiliterization of 
the Indian Ocean are welcome. But keeping in view the realities of 
contemporary international politics, the Asian-African countries 
should not be overly optimistic about their outcome. 
It is obvious that the philosophical foundations of some of 
these ideas and proposals are different from those of the peace 
zone resolution. While the former seeks to limit or control the 
Ocean of all but very limited naval vessels, and providing for only limited 
naval forces for coastal defense on the part of each littoral state; 
3. In the event of this kind of a pact proving impossible, work towards more 
modest agreements on base limitations and/or the numbers and types of Super 
Powers vessels to be permitted in the Indian Ocean at any given time; 
4. Announce our desire to establish a nuclear-free Indian Ocean, and seek 
through diplomatic and other channels to win general acceptance of such a 
proposal; 
fl. Recognize that the substantial world-wide naval buildup of the Soviet 
Union requires a measured response on our part to sustain a modern, mobile 
naval capability in general. However, in so far as the Indian Ocean is 
concerned, we should not now increase our deployment there .... [Ibid., p. 11.] 
4fl. William J. Barnds, "Arms Race or Arms Control in the Indian Ocean?" 
America (Washington, D.C.), 14 October 1972, p. 282. 
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superpower presence and rivalry in the area, the latter proposes to 
eliminate all activity by outside powers, including the superpow-
ers, that holds the potential for generating tensions.46 All the 
same, efforts of the first type are welcome because they influence 
public opinion within the United States in a direction away from 
the arms race mentality. Such efforts also facilitate the task of 
Soviet decision-makers as well, for the latter do want to protect 
their national interests in the area but without entering into an 
unlimited arms race to achieve the purpose. They thus strengthen 
the movement to create a peaceful international order in the 
Indian Ocean area. 
Although some of the efforts and ideas about arms limitation 
and/or balanced forces are well-intentioned, a section of the 
Indian Ocean littoral opinion reads into them something which is 
objectionable. It finds these ideas unacceptable on the ground that 
if the littoral countries become a party to an agreement between 
the two superpowers about their military presence at a certain 
level, it would, by implication, confer legitimacy on foreign 
presence in the Indian Ocean. Also, the arms limitation idea has 
several practical difficulties. For instance, it is pointed out (a) how 
many Russian vessels are equal to one nuclear-powered aircraft 
carrier, to one base facility and to an alliance partner and (b) how 
the proximity of Subic Bay and home ports of the U.S. Sixth 
Fleet is to be compensated against longer lead distances for the 
Russians. It is also argued that an agreement on arms limitation 
may provide for a ceiling much higher than the force levels they 
deploy at present. On these grounds a defence expert pleads that 
"the most easily monitorable balanced presence is non-presence of 
all external powers."47 
The countries of the Indian Ocean littoral are faced with a 
situation from which there seems to be no escape at least in the 
near future. Lack of cooperation by a section of important 
countries, particularly the USA and the Soviet Union, has taken 
the Indian Ocean countries into some sort of blind spot insofar as 
the peace zone efforts are concerned. In these circumstances, there 
seems to be no way out except to try to discover some meeting 
ground between the views of the littoral countries on the one hand 
and those of the superpowers on the other. 
46. Foreign vessels in the Indian Ocean are not altogether excluded, according 
to the 1971 peace zone resolution. Only those "conceived in the context of great 
power rivalry" are being sought to be shut out. 
47. K. Subrahmanyam in a communication to the author. 
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It may well be to the advantage of the Indian Ocean countries 
to explore the possibilities of an international order in this area 
which provides for an agreed arms limitation arrangement on the 
part of all the parties concerned, an arrangement which keeps 
superpower rivalry at a level which is not injurious to the 
socioeconomic growth of the peoples of the area. This calls for an 
earnest consideration of the alternatives of the type mentioned 
above. This could be accomplished by accommodating, within the 
broad framework of the peace zone concept, the philosophy of 
arms control, which is the crux of many proposals. The peace zone 
as an ultimate objective will remain immutable. If the Ad Hoc 
Committee of the Indian Ocean, in collaboration with the 
superpowers, is able to work out an arrangement, perhaps the 
peace and prosperity of the region can be secured. 
The suggestion may meet with opposition from certain 
sections of public opinion on the grounds stated above. It may 
make the task of establishing a zone of peace more difficult. There 
is some validity in this argument. But one may ask if ideal 
solutions are possible in this world as it is today. The choice may 
be between a limited presence of outside powers and tension 
generating unrestricted rivalry between them. At least in the 
present time frame, the peace zone does not seem to be an 
available choice, although its realization is perhaps brought 
closer by the acceptance of an arms limitation agreement. 
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